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Abstract 
 
In our general equilibrium model, the variety of specialized service links affects 
international production fragmentation in manufacturing. Decreases in cost of education 
or fixed cost of service links raise the relative supply of skilled workers, increase service 
specialization, and decrease the price of aggregate services. Consequently, the market for 
service- and skill-intensive component manufacturing enlarges, raising relative demand 
for skilled workers. Empirically, endogenous change in international outsourcing rather 
than skill-biased technological progress is the main reason for a modest decline in wage 
gap despite the rapid rise in relative supply of skilled workers in Singapore from 1978 to 
2000.  
 
Keywords: Production Fragmentation; Service Links; Wage Inequality; Singapore; 
Technological Progress 
JEL classification: F16; J31; O53 
 
1. Introduction 
 
How does one reconcile an increased supply of skill with a rise in the skill 
premium? A very interesting answer proposed recently by Acemoglu is that the rightward 
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shift of the relative supply of skilled labor by itself leads to an induced rightward shift of 
the relative demand for skilled labor (see Acemoglu [2002] for a treatment of this idea). 
Consequently, the wage gap or skill premium is kept from falling by as much, and, if the 
induced demand shift is sufficiently strong, we could actually observe rising wage 
inequality accompanying the increase in the supply of skill. The propounded theory sees 
a market size effect associated with an increase in the supply of skilled workers in the 
conduct of R&D activities, which makes skill-complementary innovation more profitable. 
The result is an endogenous skill-biased technological progress spurred by abundant skill 
supply. 
Such a theory can throw some light on the huge rise in wage inequality observed 
in several advanced industrial economies in the past two to three decades but it would 
seem to have limited applicability to other countries that have also undertaken rapid 
human capital accumulation but that do very little basic R&D. The overwhelming share 
of world R&D activities is concentrated in only a small handful of OECD countries—the 
G7 countries, in particular. Our interest in trying to identify other sources of induced 
demand shifts brought about by rapid increases in skill supply was piqued by the 
experience of Singapore, which, although it started from a low base, engaged in very 
rapid human capital accumulation in the past two decades or more. Yet, this is a country 
that has performed very little basic R&D. Its historical development as a trading and 
service economy supporting an industrial sector whose production activities are 
dominated by multinational enterprises led us to explore both theoretically as well as 
empirically the relationship between service links and wage inequality. 
Our story is roughly as follows. The increase in the supply of skilled labor and a 
comparative advantage held by Singapore in providing the activities constituting service 
links, especially as they can be provided by firms separately from those involved in the 
production blocks, served to encourage the outsourcing of production activities by parent 
firms in the advanced industrial economies.  With services being skilled labor intensive, 
there is, with worldwide increases in fragmentation, an increase in demand for skilled 
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labor that roughly matches the increase in supply, without having to rely on skill biased 
technological progress as in studies of more advanced economies.1        
Singapore’s economic growth since her independence in 1965 has been 
phenomenal. Per capita GDP has increased from US$512 in 1965 to US$20,732 in 2001 
at current market prices. Using the period from November 1997 to October 1998 as the 
base year, real per capita GDP were S$4,120 and S$36,381 respectively in 1965 and 2001, 
generating an average real per capita annual growth rate of 6 percent.2 The rapid rise in 
incomes has been accompanied by a modest decline in the wage gap compared to a 
sharply rising supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. In 1978 when the 
earliest data on relative wages are available, the ratios of the average monthly earnings of 
managerial and professional workers (defined as skilled workers) to the average monthly 
earnings of production and manual workers (defined as unskilled workers) in the 
manufacturing sector and the entire economy were 4.96 and 3.62 respectively. The 
corresponding ratios have both dropped to 2.37 in 2000. Such a decline in the wage gap is, 
however, not comparable to the very sharp increase in the supply of skilled workers 
relative to unskilled workers. We normalize the ratios of the supply of skilled workers to 
unskilled workers (both by education and occupation) and the ratios of skilled wage to 
unskilled wage to 1 in 1978 and trace the time trends from 1978 to 2000 in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1: Wage gap and relative supply of skilled labor, 1978 to 2000] 
 
Figure 1 depicts the trends of 3 measures of the supply of skilled relative to 
unskilled labor: (a) the ratio of the supply of workers with post-secondary, polytechnic, 
and tertiary education to the supply of workers with educational attainment below the 
former in the entire economy, (b) the ratio of the supply of managerial and professional 
workers to the supply of production and manual workers in the entire economy, and (c) 
the ratio of the supply of managerial and professional workers to the supply of production 
and manual workers in the manufacturing sector. All three series increased to more than 4 
                                                 
1 We are very grateful to Professor Ronald Jones for this interpretation of our paper, given during his visit 
to Singapore.  
2 The computations are based on data collected from the website of the Singapore Department of Statistics 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg. 
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times the original levels from 1978 to 2000. A simple demand-supply framework 
suggests that an outward shift of the relative supply curve of such a big magnitude would 
have caused a huge decline in the relative wage rate, holding the relative demand curve 
unchanged.3 However, the relatively modest decline in the wage gaps to about half of the 
original levels from 1978 to 2000 would suggest that the relative demand curve must 
have shifted out. 
What are the possible causes of the outward shift in the relative demand for 
skilled workers in Singapore? Before answering this question, we first review the 
experiences of other countries. Studies of the United States showed that increases in the 
relative supply of non-production workers to production workers coincided with the 
increase in the wage of non-production workers relative to production workers since the 
middle of 1980s (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1999). Machin (1996) showed 
that wage inequality increased very dramatically in the United Kingdom since the late 
1970s. Similar to the case of the United States, the United Kingdom also experienced an 
increase in the relative share of skilled workers. Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) documented 
a rise in wage dispersion in Mexico since the mid-1980s, coinciding with the economy 
becoming more skill-abundant. One interpretation of the experiences of these countries is 
that the demand curve could have shifted out by more than the outward shift of the supply 
curve, bringing about an increase in the wage gap associated with an increase in the 
relative supply of skilled workers.  
Several researchers have advocated that technology is the main cause of 
increasing wage inequality. In particular, mainly based on U.S. data, Acemoglu (2002) 
argued that the rapid increase in the supply of skilled workers has induced the 
development of skill-complementary technologies. Technological developments may 
                                                 
3 In the case of a small open economy with the two-factor (skilled and unskilled labor), two-good 
Heckscher-Ohlin structure, it is possible that an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor leads to a 
change in the relative supply of the two goods (according to the Rybczynski theorem) without any change 
in the relative wage so that the relative demand curve is, in effect, horizontal. This would, however, be the 
case only if the economy’s relative factor supply stays within the cone of diversification. From the 
perspective of the Singapore experience, which motivates this paper, the industrial restructuring that has 
accompanied the rapid pace of human capital accumulation, with the destruction of unskilled labor 
intensive industries and creation of more and more skill-intensive industries over the past two to three 
decades, suggests that the economy has constantly moved into new cones correspondingly to more skill-
intensive industries. The implication is that the effective relative demand schedule facing this small open 
economy is downward sloping, made up of adjoining flat portions.    
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have further impact on the organization of the labor market, and hence on the structure of 
wages. Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) argued that pervasive skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC), rather than increased trade with developing countries, is 
the main reason for the drastic decrease in demand for less skilled workers in the U.S. 
and other developed countries. Without rigorous testing, they suggested that the same 
force is operating in less developed countries, which have been expanding their 
manufacturing sectors and upgrading the skills of their workforce: increased proportion 
of skilled labor and relatively stable wages of non-production workers. However, using 
their Figure A1 and Figure A2, we see that in the 1980s, there were more developing 
countries which experienced increased proportion of non-production workers and 
declining relative wage: Korea, Venezuela, Panama, Ethiopia, and Guatemala. Using 
(currently discontinued) industrial data from United Nations General Industrial Statistics, 
and employing a method similar to Katz and Murphy (1992), Berman and Machin (2000a, 
2000b) decomposed changes in the wage share of skilled workers into within and 
between industries and found that within-industry changes are more important in high-
income countries as well as middle-income countries but not low-income countries, 
implying SBTC for the first two groups of countries. They also found positive 
correlations of within-industry changes in non-production wage bill shares between U.S. 
and 11 out of 12 middle-income countries in the sample, suggesting diffusion of skill-
biased technological change from developed to developing countries. 
We argue that induced skill-biased technological progress is not the main driving 
force in Singapore for the following reasons. First, compared to the G-7 countries, 
Singapore does not have a large pool of skilled workers, especially R&D personnel, 
despite the rapid increase in the share of skilled workers in the economy. The skill level 
of Singaporean workers is still relatively low compared to that of advanced countries and 
hence, the R&D conducted in Singapore is more of an applied nature, rather than basic 
research. In fact, we document empirically that, in so far as there has been any induced 
technological progress through the applied R&D activities, it has been unskilled-biased 
rather than skill-biased. Second, Singapore is a small open economy, relying on the world 
market and the operations of multinational corporations in Singapore. Way before her 
independence, Singapore had been a free port, engaged in entrepôt trade, linking the 
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region to the world. Since her independence, foreign investors have been actively sought 
after. As Singapore moved up the value-chain of the international production ladder, 
multinational corporations have also increased the skill and technology intensities of their 
investments in Singapore. More recently, Singapore has sought to be the regional 
business center, providing support services such as management, logistics, finance, and 
telecommunications to multinational corporations in their operations in the region. As 
argued by Feenstra (1998), by allowing trade in intermediate inputs, globalization has an 
impact on employment and wages that are observationally equivalent to changes caused 
by technological innovations. Hence, within-industry shifts in labor demand are not just 
restricted to factor-biased technological progress, but could be caused by trade in 
intermediate products within the same industry as well as international outsourcing. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) found that international outsourcing explains 20 percent of 
the shift in relative demand toward non-production workers in U.S. manufacturing during 
1979—1990 and that the increased use of computers and other high-technology 
equipment explains 30 percent of the shift. 
Most of the existing literature has examined the pattern of the wage gap for 
advanced countries. None has compared the influences of technology and global 
production sharing on the evolution of the wage gap for small open economies such as 
Singapore. In this paper, using appropriate measures, we will separate out the influences 
of technology and international production fragmentation and empirically test their 
impact on the wage gap. The case of Singapore is interesting and apt for testing new 
mechanisms explaining relative wage movements within a world of international 
outsourcing since it has a long history of economic development based upon reliance on 
attracting parent firms in advanced economies to place production blocks within its 
shores with strong support from service links. Our empirical results show that Singapore 
has experienced a technological progress biased toward unskilled workers. Despite the 
rapid increase in the relative supply of skilled workers and the technological progress 
biased toward unskilled workers, the wage gap was prevented from falling drastically by 
the process of international production fragmentation.  
Theoretically, our paper makes a contribution to the literature by developing a 
model of international production fragmentation for a small open economy in which 
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service links are important for specialization in manufacture parts and components across 
national borders. The model enables us to study how an increase in the supply of skilled 
workers in a small open economy will attract international production fragmentation into 
activities which are more skill-intensive, or, in particular, requiring more aggregate 
services. In other words, the spectrum of international production fragmentation is 
changed as the relative supply of skilled workers increases. The increase in the supply of 
skilled workers has a direct downward pressure on the wage gap; however, the 
participation in global production sharing will increase the demand for skilled workers, 
and hence exert an upward pressure on the wage gap. This endogenous shift in the 
demand for skilled workers will at least partially offset the downward movement of the 
wage gap. We argue that international outsourcing as a demand shifter provides more 
explanatory power than skill-biased technical progress for small and open economies 
where fundamental R&D is basically absent. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides intuition 
on service links and the model of international outsourcing to be developed. Section 3 
sets up the structure of the closed economy version of the model while section 4 
examines its general equilibrium solution. Section 5 investigates the impact of changes in 
costs and supply of skilled workers on service specialization and the wage gap. An 
extension to a small open economy endogenizing the extent of international outsourcing 
is provided in section 6. Section 7 further endogenizes the process of human capital 
accumulation. Section 8 presents the empirical study on the Singapore economy and 
section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The conceptual model 
 
Service links are essential in connecting production blocks and the costs of 
establishing these service links are primarily viewed as fixed costs in Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1990, 2001). The slicing up of an integrated production structure into 
different production blocks so as to take advantage of a lower marginal cost of production 
has to be balanced off with the fixed cost of providing service links to coordinate the 
various production blocks. In their framework, the extent of the market limits the degree 
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of production fragmentation. However, the characteristics and the provision of service 
links and the interaction with the fragmentation of manufacturing are not modeled 
formally in their papers. Existing models of production fragmentation in the literature are 
not satisfactory: they neither endogenize the extent of production fragmentation nor use a 
general equilibrium framework to study the impact on the skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
Human capital accumulation, central to economic development, is also not modeled in 
these papers on production fragmentation.4 We attempt to develop a model which enables 
us to examine how the specialization of service links is linked to the production 
fragmentation in manufacturing, how the fixed and variable costs of service providers 
will affect the degree of international outsourcing in component production in 
manufacturing, and the implications for the skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
Before proceeding to develop a formal model of production fragmentation, it is 
essential to understand better the characteristics of service links which facilitate the 
disintegration process of production. First of all, many services such as 
telecommunications, freighting, warehousing, distribution, marketing, accounting, 
banking, and legal consultation are all required for outsourcing to occur. These services 
do not occur in vertical stages but are bundled together in a horizontal fashion as a 
service link. Furthermore, fragmentation of these services into a greater variety of 
specialized services occurs in a horizontal fashion. Secondly, the provision of specialized 
services is skill-intensive,5 especially in the initial setting up of these operations. Setup 
costs include costs of gathering and analysis of information, costs of networking and 
coordination with other service providers, and possibly costs of product differentiation, 
                                                 
4 Burda and Dhulosh (2000) modeled “fragmentation” as roundabout-ness in the production process giving 
rise to increasing returns but not as different production blocks producing parts and components. De Groot 
(2001) modeled the outsourcing of support services but not the slicing of the value chain. Using contract 
theory, Grossman and Helpman (2002) focused on the search for an intermediate input provider. Long, 
Riezman, and Soubeyran (2001) formalized the idea that component production in manufacturing is 
facilitated by aggregate services. However, the number of specialized service providers is exogenous in 
their model. They are concerned with trade in components and services. Building on their basic setup of the 
service sector and link to manufacturing, we incorporate skilled and unskilled workers, endogenize the 
entry and exit of specialized service providers, and determine the extent of international component 
outsourcing in a general equilibrium model of a small open economy as in Hoon and Ho (2001). Hoon and 
Ho (2001), however, did not have skilled versus unskilled workers, nor an explicit modeling of service 
links.   
5 For example, the share of managerial and professional workers in total employment in financial and 
business services for Singapore in 2000 was 63.9%, much higher than 34.7%, the corresponding share for 
manufacturing in 2000. In 1974, the figures were 21.1% and 10.3% for financial and business services, and 
manufacturing respectively. 
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which are likely to involve skilled workers instead of unskilled workers. Once these setup 
costs are incurred, the marginal costs of providing services are primarily wage costs of 
unskilled workers. Thirdly and lastly, the non-tradability of services suggests that the 
providers of service links and the component manufacturers utilizing these services are 
located in the same place. With technological progress and liberalization, however, it is 
possible that services become more tradable.6  
Given the above observations on services, and service links in particular, we 
propose that each specialized service is like a differentiated product and its provision 
requires a setup cost involving skilled workers and a marginal cost involving unskilled 
workers. Each specialized service provider operates in a monopolistically competitive 
environment. Free entry and exit of specialized service providers will drive profits to zero, 
and determine the equilibrium number of specialized services, which is also the extent of 
variety of specialized services available. All the available specialized services form a 
bundle of aggregate service, which is the service link required by component 
manufacturers in the process of production fragmentation. The extent of variety of 
specialized services may be viewed as the extent of fragmentation of the aggregate 
service. This horizontal fragmentation of aggregate service is limited by the available 
pool of skilled workers.  
The aggregate service in the form of a service link is purchased by a component 
manufacturer, together with the hiring of unskilled workers. More aggregate services are 
required for a component manufacturer who is producing a more sophisticated 
component, which is more skill-intensive effectively. Each component manufacturer 
operates in a perfectly competitive environment. All the components produced are 
assembled, in a sense linked by the aggregate service, to form a final manufacture 
product. In other words, the vertical fragmentation of manufacturing is facilitated by the 
aggregate service link. In a closed economy, the total number of manufacture components 
required for the final manufacture product is exogenous. When a small open economy 
framework is used, the range of manufacture components produced in the small open 
                                                 
6 Other characteristics of services include intangibility, non-storability, and network effect. These features 
may be incorporated in future research. Being intangible, markets for services may be incomplete. The non-
storability of services suggests that the speed of delivery of services is crucial in the operations of service 
links.  Finally, the network or clustering effect of services may bring about increasing returns to scale. 
 9
economy versus the rest of the world is made endogenous. In particular, a larger supply 
of skilled workers or a reduction in the set-up cost of specialized services will lower the 
endogenous price of aggregate services and encourage production fragmentation in the 
manufacturing sector, extending the range of manufacture components produced in the 
small open economy and moving up the value chain of international production sharing. 
An increase in the supply of skilled workers or a decrease in the set-up cost of specialized 
services may be viewed as an increase in the effective size of the local market of services, 
which in turn induces an enlargement of the small open economy’s share of the 
international market of manufacture components. 
In the model economy, apart from the manufacture product which entails 
components, there is another final good which is consumed. The production of this final 
good requires only unskilled workers. Unskilled workers may be hired by this final good 
producer, by component manufacturers, or by specialized service providers. Skilled 
workers, however, can only be hired by specialized service providers in the model, for 
simplicity.7  
An increase in the supply of skilled workers, or a reduction in the set-up cost of 
specialized services, will directly depress the skilled-unskilled wage ratio in a closed 
economy, akin to an outward shift in the relative supply curve. However, in a small open 
economy engaged in production fragmentation, the endogenous decline in aggregate 
services attracts foreign investors outsourcing a larger spectrum of manufacture 
components. This larger spectrum of manufacture components requires more aggregate 
services and hence is effectively more skill intensive. Consequently, an induced increase 
in the relative demand for skilled workers will exert an upward pressure on the skilled-
unskilled wage ratio, offsetting the initial downward impact on the wage gap. Whether 
the induced effect is larger than the direct effect depends on whether the response of the 
extent of manufacture fragmentation is sufficiently elastic with respect to the increase in 
the supply of skilled workers. It can be shown that, in a small open economy, the real 
consumption wage of unskilled workers will also unambiguously increase.  
As human capital deepens in developing countries in the process of growth, the 
wage gap may drop as the supply of skilled workers is increased. The fall in the wage gap 
                                                 
7 This assumption can be relaxed but the qualitative results of the model will remain intact. 
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acts to dampen the incentive to acquire skill. However, as implied by our model, 
participating in international outsourcing provides a channel through which the incentive 
to acquire skill is retained: the wage gap is prevented from falling drastically despite a 
rapid increase in the supply of skilled workers. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998, 1999) 
stressed that evaluations on schooling and impacts on wages using partial equilibrium 
“treatment” models are misleading. Our general equilibrium approach thus provides a 
correct framework to study the evolution of wages and supply of skilled workers in small 
open economies. 
 
3. Structure of the closed-economy model 
 
3.1. The service sector 
 
The aggregate service S is a horizontal bundle of specialized services mi, for i = 
1...n, and takes the CES functional form:   
αα
1
1


= ∑
=
n
i
imS          (1) 
where 0 < α < 1.  Taking the price of specialized service pi as given and solving the cost 
minimization problem  
         (2) 

= ∑
=
n
i
ii mpm
Ps
i 1
min
subject to (1) and setting S = 1, where PS is the price of the aggregate service,  we have  
 1
1
−= αii ASpm          (3) 
where 
α
α
α
1
1
1
−
=
− 

= ∑n
j
jpA  is a price index, taken as exogenous by individual specialized 
service providers. Using the inverse demand function implied by (3), the marginal 
revenue of a specialized service provider is  
 ii pMR α= .         (4) 
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To provide specialized service, a setup cost of fwH and a variable cost of cwLmi are 
incurred, where wH and wL are the skilled and unskilled wage rates respectively, f is the 
fixed number of skilled workers required for setting up the operation, and c is the number 
of unskilled workers required to produce one unit of specialized service. Equating 
marginal revenue to marginal cost of specialized service gives 
 α
L
i
cwp =          (5) 
where 1/α is interpreted as the markup. Assuming free entry and exit of specialized 
service providers, each specialized service provider earns zero profits: 
  L
i
H
i cwm
+fwp = .        (6) 
Combining (5) and (6), we have i
i
H
p
m
fw )1( α−= , meaning that a fraction of the price is 
used to pay for the setup cost. Assuming symmetric equilibrium for the specialized 
service providers, we have 
 Snm α
1−
= ,         (7) 
 pnPS α
α 1−
= .         (8) 
Substituting (5) and (7) into (6) gives 
 α
αα
α
α S
cw
fwn L
H −





 −= 1 .       (9) 
From (9), we see that, the extent of horizontal fragmentation is limited by the size of the 
market S, and the fixed number of skilled workers required for startup. Of course, we will 
endogenize S later on.  
 
3.2. The goods sector 
 
There are two final goods in the economy: X and Y. The production of X requires 
parts and components while that of Y merely requires unskilled labor. To produce one 
unit of Y, aY units of unskilled workers are required. Under perfect competition, the 
representative firm in Y earns zero profits and the price of Y is given by 
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 .         (10) LYY waP =
In the production of X, a component manufacturer produces a component j in the interval 
[0, k], where k is the exogenously given number of stages or number of components 
required in the closed economy. To produce one unit of X, one unit of component j is 
required for each j in the interval [0, k]. To produce one unit of j, one unskilled worker 
and bj units of aggregate services are required, where b > 0. Hence, components of higher 
stages (bigger j) require more support from the service link, and effectively are more 
skill-intensive, or service-intensive. Assuming that each component manufacturer 
operates in a perfectly competitive environment, the price charged by the component 
manufacturer j is 
 .        (11) S
L
j bjPw +=π
Assembly of the manufacture components is assumed to be costless and competitive. 
Zero profits imply that the price of X is 
 .        (12) (∫ += k SLX djbjPwP 0 )
Note that the total demand for aggregate service is given by XbkbjdjX
k
2
2
0
=∫ . In 
equilibrium, demand equals supply, giving 
 XbkS
2
2
= .         (13) 
Substituting (13) into (9), and in turn into (7) and (8), we have 
 





−= L
H
cw
fwm α
α
1
,        (14) 
 ( )ααααααα L
H
S cwbkX
fwP
−−





−
−=
1
2
1
2)1(
1
1 ,    (15) 
 
αα
α
α





 −= X
fw
cbkwn H
L
2
1 2 .       (16) 
We see that PS is decreasing in X as the fixed cost of service link is spread thin by a larger 
X. Again, n is increasing in X as the extent of the market limits the degree of 
specialization. Substituting (15) into (12) gives 
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ααα
α
α
α 








 −
−+=
−
2
1
1
1 2
1 LH
L
X
wcbk
X
fwkwP .    (17) 
 
3.3. The consumer 
 
The representative consumer has a utility function given by 
         (18) ββ −= 1),( YXYXU
where 0 < β < 1. The budget constraint faced by the representative consumer is 
        (19) HwLwYPXP HLYX +=+
where L and H are the endowments of unskilled labor and skilled labor respectively in the 
economy. The demand functions for X and Y are respectively 
 ( HwLw
P
X HL
X
+= )β ,       (20) 
 ( ) ( HwLw
P
Y HL
Y
+−= )β1 .       (21) 
 
4. General equilibrium of the closed-economy model 
 
The market clearing conditions for the unskilled and skilled workers are 
respectively 
 ,        (22) YancmkXL Y++=
 .         (23) nfH =
From (23), we have 
 
f
Hn =           (24) 
which implies that the degree of horizontal fragmentation in aggregate services is limited 
by the endowment of skilled labor and the setup cost. Substituting (14) and (16) into (22) 
and (23) gives 
 YaXcbk
fw
wkXL YH
L
+








 −+=
−− ααα
α
α
2
1 2
11
,    (25) 
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 ( ) α
αα
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


 −= 1
2
2
1 f
w
XcbkwH H
L
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Hence, we have a system of six equations, namely (10), (17), (20), (21), (25) and (26), in 
six unknowns: PY, PX, wL, wH, X and Y. We are able to solve for the quantities, the 
relative price, and the relative wage. The solutions are 
 
( )[ ]
),,,,,(
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2
1 2
1
−−−−++
− =
−−


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cbk
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β
α
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Substituting (27) and (29) into (15) gives 
 c
H
f
w
P
L
S α
α
α
−


=
1
1 .        (31) 
Substituting (29) into (14) gives 
 
( )[ ]


=
−−




+




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f
H
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1
αβα
β
α
.  (32) 
Note that substituting (27) and (29) into (16) gives n = H/f, which is (24). 
 
5. Impact on service specialization and wage gap 
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 5.1. Exogenous increase in k 
 
As the required number of components increases exogenously, the demand for 
aggregate services linking and supporting component manufacturing increases, shifting 
up the demand for skilled workers, and resulting in a higher skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
Requiring more manufacture components translates into a higher price PX of the final 
manufacture product relative to PY, price of good Y. Consequently, X decreases, and Y 
increases. 
 
5.2. Decrease in fixed cost f  
 
A decrease in f will decrease the price of aggregate services relative to unskilled 
wage rate, increase the number of specialized service providers, and decrease the quantity 
of services supplied by each provider. The new equilibrium quantity of the final 
manufacture good will become larger. The skilled-unskilled wage gap will be reduced. 
Relative price PX/PY is also reduced. 
 
5.3. Decrease in marginal cost c   
 
Unlike a decrease in fixed cost, a decrease in marginal cost will raise the quantity 
of services supplied by each specialized service provider. The number of specialized 
service providers is not affected by a decrease in the marginal cost. The impact on other 
variables and ratios are similar to those corresponding to a decrease in the fixed cost. 
 
5.4. Increase in skilled labor H   
 
An increase in the supply of skilled labor is equivalent to a decrease in the fixed 
cost, bringing a greater extent of horizontal fragmentation in aggregate services. In 
particular, the wage gap will be narrowed. Opening up of the economy to foreign talent 
or a liberalization of the service sector such that the provision of service link is not 
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limited by the local pool of skilled workers is theoretically captured by an increase in H 
in the model. 
Note that, in a closed economy set-up, either a decrease in f or an increase in H 
would raise the number of specialized service providers, reduce the price of aggregate 
services relative to the unskilled wage rate, and depress the skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
However, when we open the economy to international outsourcing in component 
manufacturing, there will be an additional and induced effect on the relative demand for 
skilled workers, which may offset the initial downward pressure on the wage gap. Such a 
general equilibrium extension to a small open economy is presented in the next section. 
 
6. Extension to a small open economy 
 
As in Hoon and Ho (2001), an MNC places skill-intensive component 
manufacturing in the US and labor-intensive component manufacturing in Singapore, the 
small open economy: activities in the interval [k, 1] take place in the US while those in [0, 
k] take place in Singapore. Producing manufacture parts and components in the US is 
similar to doing so in Singapore except that the wages and price of aggregate services are 
different across the two countries. Since the total supply of skilled workers is far larger in 
the US than in Singapore, (31) would imply that PS*/ wL* is less than PS/ wL, where we 
use an asterisk to denote a US variable. The MNC takes the price of X, PX, as given. The 
zero profit condition for the production of X is 
 ( ) ( )∫∫ +++= 1 **0XP k SLk SL djbjPwdjbjPw .     (33) 
The unit cost of producing the marginal component is equal in both countries: 
 .       (34) ** SLSL bkPwbkPw +=+
Using (24), (31), (33), and (34), we are able to derive a quadratic expression for k: 
( ) ( ) .0P5.02P5.02 X**1X**2*1* =−++−++


 −
−−
S
L
S
LL
S bPwnkbPwbckcwnPb α
α
α
α
αα  
           (35) 
To simplify notations, we re-write (35) as 
  032
2
1 =Ω+Ω+Ω kk
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where Ω1 < 0, Ω2 > 0, and Ω3 > 0. We may solve for k and obtain 
 0),,,,(
2
4 **
1
31
2
22 >=Ω
ΩΩ−Ω−Ω−=
+++−+
S
L Pwbcnkk .    (36) 
In the extension to a small open economy, (24) (the limit to specialization in services), 
(29) (the relative wage rate of skilled to unskilled), and (31) (price of aggregate services 
relative to the wage rate of unskilled workers) remain the same as before. 
 
6.1. Increase in  or *Lw *SP  
 
An exogenous increase in the cost of either  or  would shift up the cost of 
the existing range of manufacture components produced in the United States. Hence, it is 
optimal to outsource a wider range of manufacture components to be produced in 
Singapore, resulting in an increase in k. Consequently, from (29), the relative demand for 
skilled workers rises and the wage gap goes up. 
*Lw *SP
 
6.2. Decrease in marginal cost c 
 
A decrease in the marginal cost of specialized services reduces the price of 
aggregate services relative to unskilled wage rate. This induces a larger range of 
manufacture components outsourced to Singapore. A decrease in c directly reduces the 
wage gap. However, the induced effect via a larger k would suggest an upward pressure 
on the wage gap. The combined effect is ambiguous, depending on the extent of 
adjustment of fragmentation. 
 
6.3. Increase in H or decrease in fixed cost f 
 
An increase in n, the extent of specialization in services, driven by either an 
increase in H or a decrease in f, reduces the price of aggregate services and hence attracts 
a wider range of manufacture components outsourced to Singapore. Hence, service 
specialization correlates with production fragmentation in manufacturing. The 
 18
endogenous increase in k would exert an upward pressure on the wage gap, countering 
the initial downward impact on the wage gap caused by an increase in H or a decrease in f. 
In particular, if 
 11 >−
α
α
dn
dk , 
that is, the adjustment in the extent of production fragmentation in manufacturing is 
sufficiently more responsive than the adjustment in the extent of horizontal fragmentation 
or specialization in services, then the induced outward shift in the relative demand for 
skilled workers will overwhelm, resulting in a rise in the wage gap. 
Based on (29) and (36), we argue that the direct negative impact on the wage gap 
due to a decrease in f is likely to be smaller in magnitude compared to an increase in H. 
Hence, compared to an increase in H, the induced outward shift in relative demand due to 
a decrease in f is more likely to dominate and bring about a rise in the wage gap. 
 
6.4. Exogenous increase in b 
 
As b increases, the amount of required aggregate services for higher-end 
components increases more than that for lower-end components, increasing the cost of 
component manufacturing in the United States relative to Singapore. Since unskilled 
workers are also required in component manufacturing, it is then optimal to outsource a 
wider range of component manufacturing to Singapore in order to take advantage of the 
lower cost of unskilled workers. Hence k increases. Both the increases in b and k will 
increase the relative demand for skilled workers in Singapore, pushing the wage gap up. 
An increase in b is akin to an exogenous skill-biased structural change. 
 
7. Incorporating endogenous human capital accumulation 
 
One of the important insights coming out of our general-equilibrium analysis is 
that the induced demand shift brought about by the increase in the supply of skill should 
act to sustain the incentive to acquire skill. To formalize this idea, we now set out to 
endogenize an individual’s decision to acquire skill, and place it in the context of our 
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general-equilibrium setup.  Suppose the ability to learn ε is uniformly distributed in the 
open-interval (0, 1) in the economy: 
 )1,0(~ Uε . 
The direct cost of acquiring education faced by a worker is given by 
 ε
κ Lw , 
where κ > 0, a cost parameter which may be influenced by government policy or subsidy 
on education. The indirect opportunity cost is the forgone unskilled wage rate. Upon 
completion of the education, the worker will become a skilled worker, attaining the 
skilled wage rate. Hence, a worker will choose to acquire education if 
L
L
H www >− ε
κ .Therefore, the threshold level of ability above which an individual will 
be skilled, and below which he will choose to be unskilled is given by 
 
1
ˆ
−
=
L
H
w
w
κε .         (37) 
The supply of skilled workers in the economy is then given by ))(ˆ1( LHH +−= ε . 
Rearranging, we have 
 1
ˆ
1 −= εL
H , or 
 1
1
−
−
= κ
L
H
w
w
L
H ,        (38) 
which is increasing in the wage gap and decreasing in the cost parameter κ. Suppose 
NLH =+ , a fixed population size. Then, we are able to derive an expression for H and 
substitute into n = H/f, which is (24), to get 
 








−
−=
1
1
L
H
w
wf
Nn κ .        (39) 
From (38) and (39), we see that a higher wage gap provides an incentive to get education 
and enhances the extent of service specialization. A reduction in the cost of education, 
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driven by a decrease in κ, possibly brought about by an increase in education subsidy or 
government expenditure per student, will increase the relative supply of skilled workers 
and the extent of specialization in services at any level of wage gap. 
Substituting (38) and (39) into (29) gives: 
( )[ ]

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

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
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α
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cbk
w
w
w
w ,    (40) 
where the endogenous k is given by (36).  
Plotting the left-hand side of (40) against (wH/wL) gives an upward slopping curve 
while plotting the right-hand side of (40) gives a downward sloping curve. To determine 
the impact on the wage gap given a decrease in κ at a level of k, we consider the shifts in 
the left-hand side and right-hand side of (40) as in Figure 2. By inspection, a decrease in 
κ will shift the right-hand side curve down, due to an increase in the relative supply of the 
skilled workers and an increase in the degree of service specialization. However, k, the 
extent of production fragmentation, is an increasing function of the degree of service 
specialization. As k increases, the right-hand side curve will shift up, offsetting the initial 
downward shift of the right-hand side curve. The extent of offsetting depends on how 
responsive is the change in k. 
 
[Figure 2: Decrease in κ] 
 
From the analysis above, we see that an increase in education subsidy, represented 
by a decrease in κ, will dampen the incentive to acquire education through a declining 
wage gap via an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers. However, a more 
efficient bundle of service links, denoted by an increase in n, attracts international 
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outsourcing into Singapore, raising the relative demand for the skilled workers, and 
preventing the wage gap and hence incentive to acquire education to drop drastically.8 
A concern for policy-makers is whether the increases in n and k are beneficial to 
the unskilled workers. To address this question, we use as a measure of the welfare of the 
unskilled worker her real consumption wage. Since the utility function is Cobb Douglas, 
it can be shown that the consumer price index is given by  and the real 
consumption wage for the unskilled worker will be given by 
ββ −1
YX PP
 ββ −1
YX
L
PP
w , 
which is the same as, using (10), 
 ββ
β
−1
)(
YX
L
aP
w . 
Hence, an increase in wL will indicate an increase in the welfare of unskilled workers 
since PX is fixed in a small open economy. Assuming the structure of service 
specialization is similar in both the US and the small open economy, the counterpart of 
(31), using (24), for the US is 
α
α
α
−= 1**
*
n
c
w
P
L
S  ,        (41) 
where we have argued earlier that since the total supply of skilled workers is far larger in 
the US than in Singapore, we have that n* > n, and so L
S
L
S
w
P
w
P <*
*
. Substituting (41) into 
(34) gives 
 *
1
1*
1
1
LL w
n
bkc
n
bkc
w






+
+
=
−
−
α
α
α
α
α
α .       (42) 
It can be shown that holding k constant, an increase in n will raise wL, and that holding n 
constant, an increase in k will raise wL. Since k is increasing in n, a decrease in κ or f will 
                                                 
8 Compared to a decrease in κ, a decrease in f, the setup cost of specialized services, is more likely to 
increase the wage gap because the impact of an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers is absent. 
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raise n, k, and wL. In other words, the real consumption wage of unskilled workers 
improves as the small open economy engages in a wider spectrum of component 
manufacturing supported by a greater extent of service specialization.9 
 
8. An empirical study using Singapore data 
 
In this section, we will estimate the reduced form of the equilibrium relative wage 
equation using Singapore data. The relative wage is measured by either the ratio of the 
average monthly earnings of managerial and professional workers (defined as skilled 
workers) to the average monthly earnings of production and manual workers (defined as 
unskilled workers) in the manufacturing sector (WGAP_M), or the ratio in the entire 
economy (WGAP_ALL). Relative wage is a function of the various demand shifters as 
well as supply shifters. In particular, the demand shifters are (a) gross expenditure in 
R&D as a proportion of GDP (GERD), (b) ratio of foreign direct investment to local 
equity investment in manufacturing (FDI_LEI_M), and (c) per capita international calls, 
with 2 periods’ lag (CALLS2, in thousands), while the supply shifters are (d) real 
government recurrent expenditure per tertiary student, with 2 periods’ lag (EXP_ED2, S$ 
at 1997 prices), and (e) ratio of workers aged 15 and above with post-secondary, 
polytechnic and tertiary education to those without, with 4 periods’ lag (SD_EDUC4).10 
Other lags of different order are dropped because they are statistically insignificant. The 
expected signs of the coefficients of the variables in the regressions on the wage gap are 
given in Table 1 with further explanations following it: 
 
[Table 1: Expected signs] 
 
Following Machin and Reenen (1998), we use GERD as a directly observed 
measure of technical change, rather than TFP which is indirectly measured. Machin and 
                                                 
9 If the equilibrium wage gap does not decline drastically, then it is probable that the real consumption 
wage of skilled workers will also increase. If the wage gap increases, then the welfare of skilled workers 
will surely improve. 
10 The values for the variables are computed based on data collected from various issues of Yearbook of 
Statistics, Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore, Report on Wages in Singapore, and the National Survey 
of R&D in Singapore. Since 1978 is the earliest year when data on GERD and wage gap in manufacturing 
are available, our estimations use 1978 as the starting date. 
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Reenen (1998) argued that R&D input is a good measure of the innovative process and 
uncovered evidence of a strong association of technical change and the relative demand 
for skilled workers for seven OECD countries. If the technological progress is biased 
toward skilled workers, we will expect a positive coefficient for GERD. On the other 
hand, a technical change biased toward unskilled workers will produce a negative 
coefficient, as implied by a downward shift in the relative demand curve. 
FDI_LEI_M is used as a proxy for the extent of international production 
fragmentation in the manufacturing sector of Singapore. This important measure is akin 
to k in the model in which an increase will raise the demand for skilled workers relative 
to unskilled, pushing the wage gap up. Omitting this measure of international outsourcing 
as an explanatory variable will make the equation to be estimated mis-specified. Its 
absence will also render the estimated coefficient of SD_EDUC4 biased and misleading 
as the direct and indirect effects (via k) of an increase in the relative supply of skilled are 
mixed up. Later, we will present regressions without FDI_LEI_M so as to highlight the 
problem of mis-specification. 
CALLS2 is a pre-determined variable representing telecommunications as a 
service link. An increase in CALLS2 is a proxy for a decrease in f in the model, implying 
a probable rise in the wage gap given an upward shift of the relative demand curve. 
Hence, the coefficient is expected to be positive. 
EXP_ED2 is pre-determined and represents a shifter in the relative supply of 
skilled workers. As real expenditure per tertiary student increases, we expect the skill 
level of the work force to be enhanced and hence an outward shift in the relative supply 
of skilled will bring about a decrease in the wage gap: a negative coefficient. An increase 
in EXP_ED2 is a proxy for a decrease in κ in the model. 
SD_EDUC4 is another pre-determined supply shifter. An increase in SD_EDUC4 
means that more workers have higher educational attainment, and hence higher skill, 
implying an outward shift in the relative supply of skilled and a direct decrease in the 
wage gap: a negative coefficient. 
Before proceeding with the OLS regressions, we first test for unit roots and 
cointegration of the variables as in Johansen (1988). The results are available upon 
request. Indeed, there are unit roots in the time series and both trace and max-eigenvalue 
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tests indicate that they are cointegrated at 1% level of significance. Hence, running an 
OLS regression on the levels of the variables (without differencing) will yield consistent 
estimates. We perform two OLS regressions with EVIEW: first using WGAP_M as the 
dependent variable, and then WGAP_ALL. The explanatory variables are the same for 
both estimations. Table 2 shows the results. 
 
[Table 2: Results with FDI_LEI_M] 
 
From Regression 1, GERD has a negative coefficient and is significant at 10% 
level of significance, suggesting a technological progress biased toward the unskilled 
workers in Singapore. Compared to the United States, the relative pool of skilled workers 
is much smaller in Singapore and the R&D done is more applied rather than basic, and 
hence the endogenous technical progress may not be biased toward skilled workers. All 
other coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level of significance and have the 
correct signs as predicted by the model. The high adjusted R2 suggests a good fit while 
the Durbin-Watson statistics, being close to 2, suggests no mis-specification of the model. 
A LM test on the residuals suggests no problem of serial correlation. 
From Regression 2, although GERD is not significant at 10% level of significance, 
its negative coefficient suggests that technological progress, if any, is not likely to be 
skill-biased. All other variables are statistically significant at 5% level of significance. 
Their estimated coefficients have the correct signs as predicted by the model. A high 
adjusted R2 and a Durbin-Watson statistics close to 2 suggest a good fit as well as no 
error of model mis-specification. A LM test on the residuals shows no problem of serial 
correlation. 
Our regression results suggest that both technology and international outsourcing 
are at work in influencing the wage gap of Singapore, a small open economy. Katz and 
Murphy (1992) found substantial shifts in relative demand and suggested that they may 
be caused by factor-biased technological change and international outsourcing without 
testing the causes. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) estimated the relative contributions of 
international outsourcing and use of high-technology equipment to the shift in relative 
demand for the United States. To our knowledge, our empirical study is the first to 
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examine both technology and international outsourcing for the case of a small open 
economy. Furthermore, a measure of service links has been included in the empirics and 
is found to have a positive impact on the wage gap. The direct effect of a predetermined 
increase in the supply of skilled would directly decrease the wage gap but would 
indirectly increase the wage gap via an increase in the extent of international outsourcing. 
Regressions 3 and 4 re-do the regression analysis without using FDI_LEI_M. 
Table 3 shows the results. The error in mis-specifying the model is obvious, as evidenced 
by the Durbin-Watson statistics. Also, the coefficients for SD_EDUC4 become 
statistically insignificant and much smaller in magnitude compared to those in 
Regressions 1 and 2. Therefore, it is important to consider the induced effect on the 
relative demand curve given an increase in the relative supply curve. Without an indicator 
of the degree of international production fragmentation such as FDI_LEI_M, the 
estimated coefficients will be biased and misleading.  
 
[Table 3: Results without FDI_LEI_M] 
 
How do we link the regression results to Figure 1? We look at the coefficients of 
SD_EDUC4, which represent the effect of an increase in the relative supply of skilled 
workers on the wage gap. The coefficients from Regressions 3 and 4, which ignored the 
endogenous increase in the range of manufacture component fragmentation, hence mis-
specified, give negative values but are insignificant statistically. See Table 4. The slightly 
negative and insignificant coefficients in Regressions 3 and 4 correspond to the modest 
declines in wage gaps shown in Figure 1 despite a rapid increase in the relative supply of 
skilled workers. Figure 1 actually has an endogenous change in production fragmentation 
hidden in it. When we incorporate a measure of production fragmentation in component 
manufacturing, FDI_LEI_M, in Regressions 1 and 2, hence correctly specifying the 
model, we see that the coefficients for SD_EDUC4 are much more negative and 
statistically significant. They represent a direct impact on wage gap. The endogenous 
outward shift in the relative demand for skilled workers is represented by the coefficients 
of FDI_LEI_M. They are positive at 1% level of statistical significance. See Table 4. In 
other words, the endogenous outward shift in the relative demand curve due to the 
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endogenous extent of fragmentation in component manufactures is an important 
explanation for the evolution of the wage gap in Singapore. International outsourcing 
hence has prevented the wage gap from falling drastically despite a rapid increase in the 
relative supply of skilled workers. 
 
[Table 4: Importance of international outsourcing] 
 
In summary, our empirical results show the importance of an induced shift of the 
relative demand curve given an outward shift in the relative supply curve. The induced 
effect is not an endogenous skill-biased technological progress as argued by Acemoglu 
(2002) for the United States. Instead, changes in the relative supply of skilled workers 
have interacted with the structure of production in a small open economy like Singapore. 
In particular, the spectrum of international production fragmentation is changed as the 
relative supply of skilled workers increases. The rise in international outsourcing would 
then have an impact on wage inequality. We have also shown that technological progress 
in Singapore is likely to be biased toward the unskilled, and that an enhancement of the 
provision of service links shifts the relative demand curve outward, pushing the wage gap 
up. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
We have developed a general equilibrium model for a small open economy in 
which the extent of variety of specialized service links affects the extent of international 
production fragmentation in manufacturing. A decrease in the cost of education or a 
decrease in the fixed cost of setting up service links will raise the relative supply of 
skilled workers, increase the extent of variety of specialized service links, and decrease 
the price of aggregate services. As a result, the market for skill-intensive component 
manufacturing is enlarged, raising the relative demand for skilled workers. This 
endogenous shift in the relative demand for skilled workers due to international 
outsourcing illustrates an important channel through which the incentive to acquire 
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education is retained despite a rapid rise in the relative supply of skilled workers in the 
process of economic development. 
Empirically, we have provided evidence that the endogenous change in 
international outsourcing, instead of skill-biased technological progress, is the main 
factor in explaining a modest decline in the skilled-unskilled wage gap despite a rapid 
rise in the relative supply of skilled workers in the Singapore economy from 1978 to 
2000. Other variables representing telecommunications service links and reduction in 
cost of education are statistically significant with the correct signs as predicted by the 
model. 
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Table 1: Expected signs 
 
Dependent Variable WGAP_M or WGAP_ALL 
Independent Variables Expected Sign of Coefficient
GERD Positive/Negative 
FDI_LEI_M Positive 
CALLS2 Positive 
EXP_ED2 Negative 
SD_EDUC4 Negative 
 
Table 2: Results with FDI_LEI_M 
 
 Regression 1 
(WGAP_M) 
Regression 2 
(WGAP_ALL) 
Sample 1978-2000 1978-2000 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
GERD -0.968115* -1.779313 -0.294534 -1.285767
FDI_LEI_M 1.342988*** 4.652658 0.453168*** 3.728980 
EXP_ED2 -0.224899*** -4.063047 -0.091346*** -3.919734
CALLS2 0.054883*** 3.136521 0.015993** 2.170961 
SD_EDUC4 -11.92073*** -3.299532 -4.312813** -2.835385
Constant 4.801847*** 13.29454 3.721981*** 24.47601 
Adjusted R2 0.931470 0.937353 
DW statistic 1.813084 1.959838 
F-statistics 58.08720 63.84264 
 
Note: *, **, and *** mean 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
Table 3: Results without FDI_LEI_M 
 
 Regression 3 
(WGAP_M) 
Regression 4 
(WGAP_ALL) 
Sample 1978-2000 1978-2000 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
GERD -1.121676 -1.430067 -0.300406 -1.058996
EXP_ED2 -0.185911** -2.316157 -0.082780** -2.851581
CALLS2 0.010719 0.670496 -0.000623 -0.107782
SD_EDUC4 -0.598056 -0.173597 -0.313025 -0.251232
Constant 5.577518*** 11.30933 3.980807*** 22.31840 
Adjusted R2 0.837341 0.896845 
DW statistic 0.480437 0.967246 
F-statistics 29.31308 48.81774 
 
Note: ** and *** mean 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
Table 4: Importance of international outsourcing 
 
 WGAP_M WGAP_ALL 
 Regression 1 Regression 3 Regression 2 Regression 4 
FDI_LEI_M 1.342988***  0.453168***  
SD_EDUC4 -11.92073** -0.598056 -4.312813** -0.313025 
 
Note: Extracted from results from regressions 1 to 4. ** means 5% level of statistical 
significance and *** means 1% level of statistical significance. 
 
Source: Computed from Yearbook of Statistics  (various issues) and Report on Wages in Singapore  (various issues).
Figure 1: Wage gap and relative supply of skilled labor, 1978 to 2000
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